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RECIDIVISM: THE TREATMENT OF THE HABITUAL OFFENDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Penal law and theory generally "addresses itself to two types of criminals:
first offenders and habitual offenders or recidivists.1 Those in the latter
group have been referred to as failures for two reasons: first, they have
failed to alter their previous behavior and make an adequate adjustment upon
returning to society; second, society has failed with them in terms of its
efforts at correction, treatment, and rehabilitation. 2 The traditional method
of dealing with the recidivist has been to increase the punishment-"increas-
ing the dosage of a medicine which failed to cure when administered in
small quantities." 3 Indeed, upon conviction for a crime, a person with prior
convictions will often be subject to recidivism la'es.4 It is the purpose of
this comment to examine the theory and operation of these laws in an at-
tempt to point out their faults and to suggest means for their re-evaluation.
II. WHAT Is RECIDIVISM?
A. Origin and History
Prior to the penal reform movement in England, there was no problem
with habitual criminals, chiefly because the punishment for the first offense
was so severe that, although the individual may have habitually resorted
to crime, his first offense usually proved to be his last.5 With the reform
movement came a reduction in the use of the death penalty and in the length
1Theoretically, recidivism is only evidence of habitual criminality. Other factors that
should be considered in defining the habitual criminal are the types of crimes com-
mitted, seriousness of the crimes, potential danger to the public, age and mental con-
dition of the offender, biological and social background of the offender, and suscepti-
bility of the offender to rehabilitation. Nevertheless, a majority of the states define the
habitual criminal in terms of general recidivism. Brown, The Treatment of the Recidivist
in the United States, 23 CAN. BAR REv. 640, 643 (1945); Note, Recidivism and Virginia's
"Come-Back" La., 48 VA. L. Rnv. 597, 599 (1962).
2 Van West, Cultural Background and Treatment of the Persistent Offender, 28 FED.
PROB. 17 (1964).
3 Sellin, Forezword to Broum, The Treatment of the Recidivist in the United States,
23 CAN. BAR REv. 637 (1945).
4 See, e.g., State v. Smith, 99 Ariz. 106, 407 P.2d 74 (1965) (sentencing a defendant
with one prior offense, petit larceny, to ten to eleven years for passing a forged check);
State v. Sedlacek, 178 Neb. 322, 133 N.W. 2d 380 (1965) (sentencing a sixty-four year
old defendant with two prior convictions to fourteen years for stealing a shotgun from
his neighbor); Application of Boatwright, 119 Cal. App. 420, 6 P.2d 972 (1931) (de-
fendant sentenced to life imprisonment for stealing a tire worth $25).
5 RAnziNowcz, A HsToRY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW-THE MOVENENT FOR REFORAM.
1750-1833, 301-96 (1948).
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of sentences, thus greatly increasing the affected individual's opportunity to
return to society, and contributing to the creation of a class of habitual
offenders.
To deal with this problem, the concept of preventive detention for re-
peating offenders was initially suggested by the Gladstone Committee Re-
port of 1895.6 While the Committee recognized rehabilitation as the goal
of the penal system, it believed loss of liberty would deter repeaters and,
should it fail to be effective as a deterrent, would at least protect society
by isolating the offenders.7
The earliest laws dealing with habitual offenders in America were "spe-
cific" in that the penalty was increased only when a specific crime was re-
peated." Most states have supplemented these "specific" recidivism laws with
"general" recidivism laws that provide for increased penalties when the sub-
sequent crime is of a certain type.9 The passage of the famous Boeumes Laws-
in New York in 1926 attracted great publicity and provided the impetus
for the movement toward passage of recidivism laws in other states.10 Today
almost every state has some type of recidivism law."- In addition, the United
States Code has been amended to permit extended terms of imprisonment
for offenders convicted of a third felony.12
B. Purpose
The primary purpose of statutes authorizing additional punishment of
persons convicted of a second or a subsequent offense is to warn first of-
fenders and thus deter their criminal tendencies.13 By making the risks in-
volved in perpetuating the crime so great, the intention is to deter potential
recidivists. However some have argued that habitual offender laws are un-
6 House of Commons, Report of the Committee On Prisons (1895).
7 Katkin, Habitual Offender La'ws: A Reconsideration, 21 BuFF. L. REv. 99 (1972).
8 3 Laws of Va. 276-77 (Hening 1823). This Statute provided for an increased pen-
alty for the second offense of hog stealing.
9 Brown, supra note 1, at 641.
'
0 Id. at 642 n.11.
11 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE S 641 (West 1955); FLA. STAT. ANN. S 775.10 (1965);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 1-7(e) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970); MAss. GEN. LAWS ArNN. ch.
279, § 25 (1959); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.10 (McKinney 1967); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-147
(1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5108 (1963); VA. CODE ANN. § 53-296 (Repl. Vol. 1972);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11-18 (1966).
12 Crimes and Criminal Procedure 18 U.S.C. § 3575.
13 See, e.g., Cobb v. Commonwealth, 267 Ky. 176, 101 S.W.2d 418 (1936); State v.
Baldonado, 79 N.M. 175, 441 P.2d 215 (1968); People v. Tramonti, 153 Misc. 371, 275
N.Y.S. 517 (1934); Arbuckle v. State, 132 Tex. Crim.R. 371, 105 S.W.2d 219 (1937);
Commonwealth v. Calio, 155 Pa. Super, 355, 38 A.2d 351 (1944); State v. Hamilton, 340
Mo. 768, 102 S.W.2d 642 (1937); Tyson v. Hening, 205 Va. 389, 136 S.E.2d 832 (1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 867 (1964); Sims v. Cunningham, 203 Va. 347, 124 S.E.2d 221 (1962),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 840 (1962); Dye v. Skeen, 135 W. Va. 90, 62 S.E.2d 681 (1950).
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necessary to deter serious offenses.14 Because the courts can impose lengthy
terms of imprisonment when sentencing truly dangerous felons, one cannot
validly say the fear of being sentenced to an additional term as a recidivist
would deter the commission of crimes for which lengthy terms could be
imposed even on first offenders. Thus, the net effect of recidivism laws
may well be to deter only comparatively petty offenses.
The chief merit of imposing an increased sentence lies in the fact the
offender is temporarily removed from society. If in fact isolation is a major
purpose of recidivism laws,15 then the recidivists are nothing more than a
custodial problem. 16
Others contend that the purpose of recidivism laws is to rehabilitate of-
fenders.' 7 However, it is difficult to imagine increased punishment as a
rehabilitative device when one considers that offenders will be detained in
the same system that has failed to rehabilitate them during their first incar-
ceration. It would be improper to impute the failure of rehabilitation en-
tirely to the penal system, but to deny that it has shortcomings is equally
naive. A crime committed by an offender with a previous criminal record
should prompt examination concerning why previous treatment has failed
and what can be presently done for the offender.
Thus, deterrence and rehabilitation cannot be accepted as valid purposes
of the recidivism statutes. Rather, punishment,18 protection, and retribu-
tion19 seem to be the basis for their continued use.
14 Katkin, supra note 7, at 106.
15 See, e.g., People v. Richardson, 74 Cal. App. 2d 528, 169 P.2d 44 (1946); Reynolds
v. Cochran, 138 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 1962); Joyner v. State, 158 Fla. 806, 30 So. 2d 304
(1947); State v. George, 218 La. 18, 48 So. 2d 265 (1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 949
(1951); People v. Marinello, 11 Misc. 2d 1026, 179 N.Y.S.2d 209 (1957); State v. Wood,
2 Utah 2d 34, 268 P.2d 998 (1954), cert. denied, 238 U.S. 900 (1954); Tyson v. Hening,
205 Va. 389, 136 S.E.2d 832 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 867 (1964); Wesley v. Com-
monwealth, 190 Va. 268, 56 S.E.2d 362 (1949); In re Hendrickson, 12 Wash. 2d 600, 123
P.2d 322 (1942); State v. Stout, 116 W. Va. 398, 180 SE. 443 (1935).
16 Sellin, supra note 3, at 638. See also D. Wksr, Trm HArrTuAL PRISONER (1963).
Studies conducted by West suggest that persistent offenders are neither violent nor
organized professional criminals.
17 See, e.g., State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 253 P.2d 203 (1953); Brown v. Common-
wealth, 100 Ky. 127, 37 S.W. 496 (1896); State v. Hamilton, 340 Mo. 768, 102 S.W.2d
642 (1937); People v. Spellman, 136 Misc. 25, 242 N.Y.S. 68 (1930); Commonwealth
v. Sutton, 125 Pa. Super. 407, 189 A. 556 (1937); Kinney v. State, 45 Tex. Crim. R. 500,
78 S.W. 225 (1904).
18 See, Scherer v. State, 278 F.2d 469 (10th Cir. 1960); People v. Poppe, 394 II. 216,
68 N.E.2d 254 (1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 798 (1946); Ex parte Jerry, 294 Mich. 689,
293 N.W. 909 (1940).
'9 See, People ex rel. Brooks v. Warden, 175 Misc. 663, 24 N.Y.S.2d 931 (1941);
Ervin v. State, 351 P.2d 401 (Olda. Crim. App. 1960); Wesley v. Commonwealth, 190
Va. 268, 56 S.E.2d 362 (1949).
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III. TYPES OF RECIDIVIST PROCEEDINGS
There are very important procedural problems inherent in the application
of any recidivism law, chiefly involving how and when the prior convic-
tion or convictions are to be alleged and proved. Several methods of han-
dling these problems have been adopted by statute and case law.
A. The Common Law Procedure
The application of a recidivism statute under the common law method
requires both an allegation of former convictions in the present indictment
or information, and proof of that allegation at the trial.20 This is the only
procedure for determining recidivist liability in which the issue of guilt for
the present offense and the issue of recividism are decided simultaneously.
Ordinary rules of evidence have long recognized that while evidence of
prior convictions is relevant and of probative value,21 it is excluded.2 2 This
rule is based upon the rationale that any evidence of prior unlawful behavior
unrelated to the offense presently charged would so unduly prejudice the
jury as to deny the defendant a fair trial.23 The common law procedure is
an additional method by which this highly prejudicial evidence can be placed
before the jury. The presentation of this evidence is allegedly justified
because it is necessary to prove prior conviction to justify the additional
penalty.24 A further attempt at justification contends that the jury is in-
structed to suppress knowledge of the prior convictions in deciding the
issue of guilt in the present case.25 Due to the prejudicial effect of such
20 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2511 (1972); IND. STAT. ANN. § 9-2208 (Rep. Vol.
1956); Ky. REv. STAT. § 431-190 (1969); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-147 (1965). Until recently,
the majority of jurisdictions employed the common law procedure, although many have
now discarded it. E.g., State v. Ferrone, 96 Conn. 160, 113 A. 452 (1921); Harris v.
State, 369 P.2d 187 (Okla. Crim. 1962).
21 Generally, such evidence is admitted only where the defendant raises the ques-
don of his own character or offers himself as a witness. McCoRmicK, EVIDENCE § 190
(2d ed. 1972); 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 57 (3d ed. 1940).
22 See, e.g., Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948); State v. Tessnear, 265
N.C. 319, 144 S.E.2d 43 (1965); State v. Myrick, 181 Kan. 1056, 317 P.2d 485 (1957);
See generally McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE § 190 (2d ed. 1972); 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 57
(3d ed. 1940).
23 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 57 and 192 (3d ed. 1940).
24 Thus, while the exceptions in note 21 supra, have some relation to the defendant's
guilt of the primary offense, the exception to accepted rules of evidence created by
the common law procedure is based on an issue irrelevant to defendant's guilt of the
primary offense.
25 See, e.g., State v. Lutz, 135 N.J.L. 603, 52 A.2d 773 (1947); State v. Martin, 275
S.W.2d 336 (Mo. 1955); State v. Meyer, 258 Wis. 326, 46 N.W.2d 341 (1951). There is
some question as to how effectively jurors can accomplish this task. Krulewitch v.
United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949); Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539 (1947);
United States v. Banmiller, 310 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1962).
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evidence many courts26 and legislatures2 have adopted other procedures
for determining liability under recidivism statutes.
B. The Supplemental Procedure
A number of states have statutes which provide for the trial of the re-
cidivism charge after there has been a verdict of guilty to the present
charge. 28 These statutes generally provide that if after conviction for the
present offense it is found that the defendant is a multiple offender, the
prosecutor must file an information alleging his prior convictions. The de-
fendant is then brought to court and asked if he is the same person who had
been previously convicted. If he replies affirmatively he is sentenced and
returned to prison. If he replies in the negative a jury is empaneled to de-
cide (beyond a reasonable doubt) the question of identity and the existence
of the prior convictions.
This type of separate determination of status is superior to the common
law procedure in two respects. By providing for a separate trial to determine
liability under the recidivism statute and by introducing evidence of prior
convictions at that trial, the serious prejudicial effects of the common law
procedure are eliminated.29 Under the common law procedure if the state
does not learn of the prior convictions until after the present trial, it is
barred from invoking the recidivism statute, which frustrates the legislative
intent. However, under the supplementary procedure, the state can invoke
the statute after the offender has been convicted for the present crime.30
26 State v. Ferrone, 96 Conn. 160, 113 A. 452 (1921); State v. Johnson, 86 Idaho 51,
383 P.2d 326 (1963); Harris v. State, 369 P.2d 187 (Okla. Crim. 1962); State v. Stewart,
110 Utah 203, 171 P.2d 383 (1946).
27See note 11 supra.
28See, e.g., ALAs. STAT. § 12.55.060 (1966); DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 11, 5 3912(b) (Supp.
1968); FMA. STAT. ANx. § 775.11 (1965); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:85-8 (Supp. 1966); N.Y.
PENAL LAw 70.10 (McKinney 1967); VA. CoDE AN. § 53-296 "(Repl. Vol. 1972); W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11-18 (1966).
29 Shargaa v. State, 102 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 873 (1958).
30 Many states providing for the supplementary procedure allow its use at any time.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.11 (1965); N.Y. PNAL LAw § 1943 (McKinney 1967);
OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2961.13 (1954). These statutes have even been interpreted to
mean that the proceeding can be instituted even after the defendant has served the sen-
tence for the present offense. People v. Kaiser, 230 App. Div. 646, 246 N.Y.S. 309 (1930);
aff'd mern., 256 N.Y. 581, 177 N.E. 149 (1931); State v. Sudekatus, 72 Ohio App. 165,
51 N.E.2d 22 (1943). Contra, Reynolds v. Cochran, 138 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 1962); State
v. Shank, 115 Ohio App. 291, 185 N.E.2d 63 (1962) (dictum). Several statutes author-
izing the supplementary procedure limit the time at which it can be invoked to before
verdict in the present case. ArAs. STAT. § 12.55.060 (1962); Mo. REv. STAT. § 556.280(z)
(Supp. 1964). Virginia allows the statute to be invoked at any time prior to the of-
fender's release from the penitentiary. Lawrence v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 51, 141
S.E.2d 735 (1965).
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The supplementary procedure, though more desirable than the common
law procedure, is not without its faults. The procedure is both time-con-
suming and expensive, in that it requires two separate trials with the possible
necessity for two juries. Far more serious problems arise concerning the
necessity of timely notice of the entire charge, when a defendant, charged
with a present crime, is unaware that he will later be charged as a recidivist.31
The response to this criticism alleges there is no need for notice of any
impending recidivist charge prior to the trial for the present offense, be-
cause recidivism is a status and is extrinsic to the issues involved in the pres-
ent crime.S2 Proponents fail to realize that notice of the recidivism charge
before trial can be vital in that it may drastically affect not only the defense
at the trial, but also the decision to plead guilty or not guilty.33 To insure
fundamental fairness, the state should be prevented from requiring a de-
fendant to plead to a criminal charge without first apprising him of what
may well be the most important aspect of the charge.3 4
C. Court Determination of Recidivism
A few jurisdictions provide that the counts charging the defendant under
the recidivism statute may be alleged in the present indictment, and that
proof thereof shall be made after conviction of the present offense before
the court sitting without a jury.3 5 Under this procedure the evidence of
the defendant's prior conviction is not introduced until after the jury has
reached a verdict in the trial for the present offense. Thus, the jury would
not be prejudiced or confused by the introduction of evidence of prior
crimes.
This procedure, however, raises a constitutional question because recidivist
proceedings are criminal in nature,3 6 and the denial of a trial by jury could
be construed as a denial of due process of law.
31 Doubtless he is aware of his prior convictions, but he cannot be charged with
knowledge of the possibility of increased punishment nor with the legal knowledge
necessary to determine if his prior convictions fall within the purview of the statute.
32 Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
33 Knowledge of an impending recidivism charge would fundamentally change the
defendant's trial tactics. Clearly a defendant would not attempt to seek clemency with
a guilty plea if he knew that he was also subject to a greatly increased sentence under
a recidivism statute.
34 The present crime may carry a penalty of a year or two; if it is the defendant's
third or fourth conviction, the recidivism statute may raise the penalty to life im-
prisonment. See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 641 (West 1955) (third offense); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 775.10 (1965) (fourth offense); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11-18 (1966) (third
offense).
35 See, e.g., KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21-107a (1964); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.16 (1964);
NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-2221(Z) (1964); ORE. REv. STAT. S 161.725 (1971).
36 Recidivist proceedings are criminal in nature. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962);
Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 (1962); Application of Boyd, 189 F. Supp. 113
COMMENTS
D. The Connecticut Method
The preceding analysis leaves little doubt that the Connecticut recidivism
procedure, taken from an English statute 7 and adopted by the Connecticut
supreme court,38 is clearly the most desirable. Under this procedure, a two
part indictment containing both the present charge and the allegation of
prior convictions is prepared and read to the defendant in the absence of
the jury. 9 Only the allegations relating to the present crime are read and
proved to the jury at the first trial, thus preventing any prejudice created
by the introduction of evidence of prior crimes to the jury before it has
reached a decision regarding the present crime. If the defendant is found
guilty of the present crime, the allegations of recidivism are then read and
proved to the jury who in turn determine liability under the recidivism
statute at that time. If the defendant is found not guilty of the present
crime the matter is dropped.
This procedure has been recognized as the most desirable because it gives
the state a speedy and inexpensive method of determining all issues, and
affords the benefit of a jury trial without the prejudicial evidence of prior
crimes.
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY
The recidivism statutes, although generally held constitutional in every
respect, have frequently come under attack.40 Critics alleging unconstitu-
tionality contend: (1) where crimes committed before enactment are used,
the statutes are ex post facto; (2) such statutes place the defendant in double
jeopardy; (3) the statutes deny the defendant due process of law; (4) be-
cause the statutes apply only to certain classes of offenders, they deny a
defendant equal protection of the laws; (5) the increased penalty is cruel
and unusual punishment.
Clearly, recidivism statutes are not ex post facto, even where the finding
of liability under the statute is based on crimes committed prior to enact-
(M.D. Tenn. 1959), aff'd mem. sub norn. Bomar v. Boyd, 281 F.2d 195 (6th Cir. 1960).
See note 64 supra.
37 Coinage Offences Act, 1861, 24 and 25 Vict., c. 99.
38 State v. Ferrone, 96 Conn. 160, 113 A. 452 (1921).
39 This procedure affords the defendant adequate notice and eliminates the possibility
that he will plead guilty with the expectation that the only punishment he could re-
ceive would be that provided as punishment for the present offense. See note 33 supra.40 See, e.g., Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967); United States v. Skeen, 126 F.
Supp. 24 (N.D. W. Va. 1954); People v. Ashley, 42 Cal. 2d 246, 267 P.2d 271 (1954);
Cross v. State, 96 Fla. 768, 119 So. 380 (1928); People v. Wilson, 246 N.Y.S.2d 608, 196
N.E.2d 251 (1963); Surratt v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 940, 48 S.E.2d 362 (1948); State
v. Lawson, 125 W. Va. 1, 22 S.E.2d 643 (1942). See generally Annot., 58 A.L.R. 20 (1929);
Annot., 82 A.L.R. 345 (1933); Annot., 116 A.L.R. 209 (1938); Annot., 132 A.L.R. 91
(1941); Annot., 139 A.L.R. 673 (1942).
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ment of the statute." No ex post facto argument can be made as long as
the most recent crime has been committed after the enactment of the statute.
The additional punishment is imposed as a direct consequence of the most
recent crime; and not a consequence of the earlier convictions.42
Others argue that when sentenced as a recidivist, the defendant is sen-
tenced a second time for his prior convictions, and is thus placed in double
jeopardy. This argument has repeatedly been held to be erroneous 43
because defendants "are not punished the second time for the earlier offense,
but the repetition of criminal conduct aggravates their guilt and justifies
heavier penalties when they are again convicted." 44
Neither the fifth45 nor the fourteenth46 amendments are violated by pro-
ceeding on an information, because no separate offense is charged. The
recidivism statutes do not create a new crime, but merely provide a basis
for increasing the penalty for a present crime because of past criminal
behavior.47
Courts have taken the position that recidivism laws do not, by their ap-
plication to a certain class of offenders, deny equal protection of the
41See, e.g., Payne v. Nash, 327 F.2d 197 (8th Cir. 1964); United States v. Sierra,
297 F.2d 531 (2d Cir. 1961); Oliver v. United States, 290 F.2d 255 (8th Ci. 1961); Wey
Him Fong v. United States, 287 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1961); cert. denied, 360 U.S. 971
(1961); Sherman v. United States, 241 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1957); Washington v. Mayo,
91 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 1956); Thompson v. State, 195 Kan. 318, 403 P.2d 1009 (1965).
42 See, e.g., Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948); Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S.
397 (1937); Wey Him Fong v. United States, 287 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
360 U.S. 971 (1961); State v. Dowden, 137 Iowa 573, 115 N.W. 211 (1908); Ross' Case,
19 Mass. (2 Pick) 165 (1824); Rand v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. (9 Gratt.) 738 (1852);
State v. Let Pitre, 54 Wash. 166, 103 P. 27 (1909).
43 See, e.g., Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948); Carlesi v. New York, 233 U.S. 51
(1914); Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912); McDonald v. Massachusetts,
180 U.S. 311 (1901); Kelley v. People, 115 IM. 583, 4 NE. 644 (1886); Goeller v. State,
119 Md. 61, 85 A. 954 (1912); People v. Shastal, 26 Mich. App. 347, 182 N.W.2d 638
(1970); State ex rel. Hines v. Tahash, 263 Minn. 217, 116 N.W.2d 399 (1962).
44Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 623 (1912).
45 See, e.g., Sherman v. United States, 241 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 254
U.S. 911 (1957); Beland v. United States, 128 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1942), cert. denied,
317 U.S. 676 (1942).
46 See, e.g., Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912); Smith v. State, 237 Ind. 532,
146 N.E.2d 86 (1958); State v. Salyer, 196 Kan. 32, 410 P.2d 248 (1966); State v. Zywicki,
175 Minn. 508, 221 N.W. 900 (1928); State v. Hicks, 213 Ore. 640, 325 P.2d 794 (1958).
47 See, e.g., Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962); Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954);
Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912); Cross v. State, 96 Fla. 768, 119 So. 380
(1928). It is also generally held that recidivism is not an element of the present offense.
United States v. Modem Reed and Ratlan Co, 159 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied,
331 U.S. 831 (1947); Jones v. United States, 18 F.2d 573 (8th Cir. 1927); People v.
Roberson, 167 Cal. App. 2d 429, 334 P. 2d 666 (1959).
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law.48 It is recognized that people or classes of people" may be treated dif-
ferently provided the basis for the different treatment is related to some
legitimate state purpose.49 With this requirement in mind, courts have held
that recidivism statutes, while authorizing unequal treatment, are permissible
because they relate to a legitimate state of interest, i.e., public protection.50
The statutes have also withstood countless eighth amendment attacks
which claim that the increased punishment amounts to the imposition of
cruel and unusual punishment.51 In denying this allegation the courts have
given the issue very little consideration, merely relying on precedent to
support their conclusions.52 A few courts have given the issue more con-
sideration, and while not declaring the statutes themselves unconstitutional,
have held the punishment in specific cases to be cruel and unusual.53
V. V GINIA's REciDivIsM LAW
The Virginia recidivism law,54 typical of those using the supplemental
48 See, e.g., McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311 (1901); Moore v. Missouri,
159 U.S. 673 (1895); Wessling v. Bennett, 410 F.2d 205 (8th Cir. 1969); Barr v. State,
205 Ind. 481, 187 N.E. 259 (1933); State v. Sandoval, 80 N.M. 333, 455 P.2d 837 (1969);
Surratt v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 940, 48 S.E.2d 362 (1948); State v. Matte, 1 Wash.
App. 510, 462 P.2d 985 (1969).
49Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson,
316 U.S. 535 (1942).
5
oSee, e.g., McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311 (1901); Moore v. Missouri,
159 U.S. 673 (1895). It has been argued that, because it is doubtful that the purpose of
public protection is served by recidivism statutes, this contention is no longer valid.
Katkin, Habitual Offender Laws: A Reconsideration, 21 BuFF. L. REv. 99, 112 (1972).
51 See, e.g., Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962);
Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912); McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S.
311 (1901); Wessling v. Bennett, 410 F.2d 205 (8th Ci. 1969); Price v. Allgood, 369 F.2d
376 (5th Ci. 1966); In re Boatwright, 119 Cal. App. 420, 6 P.2d 972 (1931). See gen-
erally Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 335.
52Katkin, Habitual Offender Laws: A Reconsideration, 21 BuFF. L. Rsv. 99, 113
(1972).
53 See, e.g., Goss v. Bomar, 337 F.2d 341 (6th Cir. 1964); Stephens v. State, 73 Okla.
Crim. 349, 121 P.2d 326 (1942).
54 VA. CODE ANN. § 53-296 (Repl. Vol. 1972).
When a person convicted of an offense, and sentenced to confinement therefor in
the penitentiary, is received therein, if it shall come to the knowledge of the
Director of the Department of Welfare and Institutions that he has been sen-
tenced to a like punishment in the United States prior to the sentence he is then
serving, the Director of the Department of Welfare and Institutions shall give
information thereof without delay to the Circuit Court of the city of Richmond.
Such court shall cause the convict to be brought before it, to be tried upon an
information filed, alleging the existence of records of prior convictions and the
identity of the prisoner with the person named in each. The prisoner may deny
the existence of any such records, or that he is the same person named therein,
or both. Either party may, for good cause shown, have a continuance of the case
for such reasonable time as may be fixed by the court. The existence of such
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procedure, 55 provides for the determination of the question of prior con-
victions after conviction and sentencing for the principal offense.
For security reasons, the recidivist proceedings are held in a building
adjacent to the penitentiary. An information is prepared for the prisoner-
defendant and is read to him. If he admits the allegations, he is sentenced
and returned to the penitentiary; if he denies the allegations, the court de-
termines whether records of the prior convictions exist. If the records do
exist, but the prisoner denies that he is the same person named in the records,
he is entitled to a jury trial on that issue.56 Even if it is determined that the
prisoner is the same person named in the record, the prior convictions are
still subject to attack.57
VI. CONCLUSION
A. Faults and Virtues of the Virginia Procedure
The chief virtue of the Virginia procedure is that it isolates the recidivist
from society and exposes him to its rehabilitative programs for longer pe-
riods of time. Also, because the proceedings are centralized,5 the sentencing
is somewhat uniform. However, there are some undesirable consequences
attending Virginia's supplemental procedure.
Perhaps the most atypical feature of Virginia's law is the broad discretion-
ary power vested in the court for sentencing purposes. The Virginia Code
records, if denied by the prisoner, shall be first determined by the court, and if
it be found by the court that such records exist, and the prisoner says that he
is not the same person mentioned in such records, or remains silent, his plea, or
the fact of his silence, shall be entered of record, and a jury shall be impaneled
to inquire whether the convict is the same person mentioned in the several rec-
ords. If they find that he is not the same person, he shall be remanded to the
penitentiary; but if they find that he is the same person, or if he acknowledge
in open court after being duly cautioned, that he is the same person, he may
be sentenced to be confined in the penitentiary for such additional time as the
court trying the case may deem proper. This section, however, shall not apply to
successive convictions of petit larceny.
If the Circuit Court of the city of Richmond cannot, on the evidence available,
make a determination of the convict's allegation of illegality of his prior con-
viction by reason of unrecorded matters of fact relative to his prior conviction,
the Circuit Court of the city of Richmond may certify such question for hearing
and determination to the court of said conviction which court shall conduct a
hearing and make a finding of fact and determination of such unrecorded matters
of fact, sending a certified copy of its order to the Circuit Court of the city
of Richmond.
55 See text at note 28 supra.
56 For a detailed discussion of the procedure used in Virginia, see Note, Recidivism
and Virginia's "Come-Back" Law, 48 VA. L. REv. 597 (1962).
57 Wesley v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 268, 56 S.E.2d 362 (1949).
58 The proceedings are held in the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. VA. CODE
ANN. § 53-296 (Rep. Vol. 1972).
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limits only the length of sentence imposed on second offenders.59 In exercis-
ing discretion, a judge may rely upon information revealed by the pre-sen-
tence report.60 This information is designed to enable a judge to determine
the offender's susceptibility to rehabilitation and thus the length of the sen-
tence that he should receive. If it is accepted that rehabilitation of the of-
fender and isolation from society are the purposes of the additional punish-
ment, the length of the sentence should reflect the rehabilitative needs of
the offender and the danger presented to society by the offender. Even so,
sentences drawn by recidivists tend to follow a standardized pattern.6 The
pre-sentence report, though often very complete, is, nevertheless, a report,
and by itself does not provide a sufficient basis for determining in advance
the proper sentence to impose in recidivism cases.
Because of the use of a second hearing subsequent to the trial for the
primary offense, the procedure is both time consuming and expensive. The
delay in imposing the increased sentence under the recidivism law may cause
the recidivist not to recognize the significance of the additional penalty.
Both problems could be solved by providing for a hearing under the re-
cividism law immediately after the trial for the principal offense.
Aside from the question of double jeopardy,6 2 a principal disadvantage
to the present procedure is that the defendant may have no knowledge of
the recidivism law until after he has pleaded in the trial for the principal
offense. Obviously from the standpoint of trial tactics, knowledge of this
impending additional punishment is very important.63
B. Some Possible Improvements
It would be presumptuous to assume that the recidivist problem can be
solved merely by modification of the present Virginia statute or by the en-
actment of any statute. More study and evaluation must be conducted in
search of answers to the questions surrounding the recidivist problem. Why
did he return to crime? Is it because of his environment, his association with
other criminals while an inmate of the penitentiary; the failure of the penal
system to properly prepare him for return to society? The answers to these
r9 VA. CODE ANN. § 53-296 (Repl. Vol. 1972).
60 VA. CoDE ANN. § 53-250 (Repl. Vol. 1972). Because the pre-sentence report con-
tains information concerning the defendant's prior convictions, the trial judge could
possibly take the defendant's bad record into consideration when setting the sentence
for the present offense. This, in effect, would result in the defendant's receiving two
penalties for recidivism, one immediately by the trial judge, and one later under the
recidivism law.
61 Note, Recidivism and Virginia's "Come-Back" Law, 48 VA. L. REv. 597, 628 (1962).
62 See text at note 43 supra.
0 See note 31 supra.
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questions will provide the basis for renewed attention to the first offenders,
for they are the latent recidivists.
In addition to placing an increased emphasis on preventing the first of-
fender from becoming a recidivist, the present law must be altered to re-
move its inadequacies. Any law which is adopted must be flexible in order
to fit the needs of the individual offender and the needs of society in rela-
tion to him. The law must also be applied uniformly and in such a way that
the recidivist will realize that the additional sentence is being imposed for a
specific crime. Finally, any recidivism law must be applied to reach all who
are subject to it.
Many courts64 and commenators 5 favor the "Connecticut Plan." '6 Under
this procedure, the offender is given complete notice of the entire punish-
ment to which he can be subjected before he is asked to plead to the present
offense. Further, the offender can receive a trial by a judge or jury who is
familiar with the defendant and the surrounding circumstances of the pri-
mary offense. Since the evidence of prior convictions is not introduced
unless and until the defendant is found guilty of the primary offense, it does
not prejudicially influence the determination of guilt. In addition, due to
the immediate determination of the recidivism issue, the defendant is more
likely to understand the reason for the additional punishment. Although
the procedure entails two deliberations by the same judge or jury, it is less
time-consuming than the present Virginia procedure utilizing two separate
trials.
As noted, the "Connecticut Plan" has many advantages, but it is not with-
out its faults. Chief among these is that because the recidivism issue is tried
in the locality immediately following the trial for the primary offense, the
procedure lacks a uniform sentencing philosophy.67 It is also possible that
through neglect and bargaining, not everyone subject to the law would be
prosecuted as a recidivist.0 8 These objections can be met, and the advantages
of the "Connecticut Plan" retained, through the use of the "Connecticut
6 4 Lane v. Warden, 320 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1963); Higgins v. State, 235 Ark. 153, 357
S.W.2d 499 (1962); Heinze v. People, 127 Colo. 54, 253 P.2d 596 (1953); State v. Fer-
rone, 96 Conn. 160, 113 A.452 (1921); People v. Sickles, 156 N.Y. 541, 51 N.E. 288
(1898).
65 Note, Recidivist Procedures, Prejudice and Due Process, 53 CORNELL L. REv. 337
(1968); Note, Recidivist Procedures, 40 N.Y.U. L. REv. 332 (1965); Note, The Pleading
and Proof of Prior Convictions in Habitual Criminal Prosecutions, 33 N.Y.U. L. REV.
333 (1958); 45 N.C. L. REv. 1039 (1967).
66 See text at note 38 supra.
67 Note, Recidivism and Virginia's "Come-Back" Law, 48 VA. L. REv. 597, 634 (1962).
6 8 Prosecutors could bargain with defendants for a guilty plea to the present offense in
return for a promise not to prosecute for recidivism. Brown, West Virginia Habitual
Criminal Law, 59 W. VA. L. REv. 30, 38 (1956).
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Plan" with an indeterminate sentence as a primary alternative to the existing
plan.
As to curbing recidivist crime, one method is to impose an indeterminate
sentence under the recidivism charge instead of an arbitrary term.69 Many
states follow this practice, limiting the sentence to a maximum term.70 This
procedure would satisfy the objection to the "Connecticut Plan" that it lacks
sentencing uniformity, because the length of incarceration would be deter-
mined by one review board. Their decision would be based upon the re-
habilitative progress of the offender and upon his relative danger to society.
Such a system more properly reflects the rehabilitative design of our penal
system .71
The other objection to the "Connecticut Plan" can easily be eliminated
by allowing the present Virginia procedure, with an indeterminate sentence
to be used if for some reason the recidivism charge is not alleged at the trial
for the primary offense.
There is much room for improvement in the handling of the recidivism
problem. It is time to recognize that the present procedure, though success-
ful in insulating society from the recidivist, turns its back on the rehabilita-
tive needs of the offender and thus provides no solution to the problem.
With an increased emphasis on the rehabilitation of first offenders and
through the use of the indeterminate sentence in conjunction with the "Con-
necticut Plan," progress can be made in solving the recidivist problem.
M.R.E.
09 Schreiber, Indeterminate Therapeutic Incarceration of Dangerous Criminals:. Per-
spectives and Problems, 56 VA. L. Rlv. 602, 603 (1970).
7oSee, e.g., HAWAII REV. LAws § 711-76 (1968); ILm. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 1-7(e)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.11, 609.12(1) (1964); WAsH. REv. CoDE
ANN. §§ 9.95, 9.010, 9.040 (1961).
71 Schreiber, Indeterminate Therapeutic Incarceration of Dangerous Criminals: Per-
spectives and Problems, 56 VA. L. REv. 602, 604 (1970).
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